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tions suggest, this focus on individual opinions is not only insufficient but
potentially dangerous. If mass morality is not to dominate in the name of
personal values, Americans must turn their attention not simply to making
opinions "autonomous" and "authentic," but to forming sophisticated judgments that reflect the intricacies of political and social realities. They must
learn not to prefer their own views in every case, but to evaluate their decisions
in concert with others. They must consider their position not only in a personal
light, but in substantive terms that include the importance of the situation, a
comprehensive view of the issues involved, and a concern for the immediate
and long-term impact of their conduct for better and for worse.
Moral decision-making, especially in democracy, requires vigorous attention to the soundness of opinions, in addition to their origin or style. In the
case of public officials, such decision-making presupposes a firm grasp of the
government's basic characteristics and goals, and an understanding of the
proper role of the individual within the larger whole. Ultimately, this kind of
perspective offers the best available guarantee that government figures will
manage national affairs in the best interest of all American citizens.
The decisive flaw in Resignation in Protest is the authors' failure to investigate the resignation experience in such substantive terms. Theirs is an
apolitical understanding of complex political events, abstracting from both
the deepest principles of the American founding and the practical workings
of contemporary U.S. government. By relying upon the observations of recent
theoreticians and psychologists, Weisband and Franck have forfeited the
lessons offered by those men most familiar with the complexities of American
political life. First among these are the American founders, whose writings
on U.S. government and politics are of unparalleled insight and sophistication.
By their very failure to consult such sources, Resignation in Protest points the
way to the kind of study necessary before America can resolve her present
dilemma.
By ROBERT E. SIAniO*
*@Copyright, 1976, Robert E. Shapiro.
Mr. Shapiro, who is a former aide to Congressman John B. Anderson and the
Republican Conference of the U. S. House of Representatives, holds a graduate degree
in political science from the University of Toronto. He is currently enrolled at the
University of Chicago Law School.

THE REFORM OF PLANNING LAW, NEAL ALLISON ROBERTS, London:
The MacMillan Press Ltd., 1976. Pp. 279. (Cloth: $28.95; Paperback:
$10.95).
Planners and lawyers may not enjoy reading Professor Roberts' new
book, The Reform of Planning Law, but they should read it anyway. The
author tells them that their plans and preoccupations with judicializing the
process are not worth very much, and I think he is right. By exploding the
myth that professionals have a monopoly on good plans and the best processes,

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 14, NO. 2

Professor Roberts has made a substantial contribution to the jurisprudence
of planning law.'
Although the focus of the book is planning law, it is not particularly
legalistic. For those who are intimidated by a lawyer's capacity to cite cases,
seemingly ad infinitum, they need not worry. Very few are mentioned. The
emphasis is on explaining and analysing the bureaucratic process, not a tight
analysis of the rather considerable case law in the area.
The Reform of Planning Law presents a readable, well argued thesis
that is as simple as it is important. Briefly, it is a directive to planning reformers: forget the plans and begin focussing on the planning process! To
this may be added a number of subthemes that run throughout the book, but
they all, in one way or another, highlight the importance of the "procedures
for drafting plans and granting the permission." 2 They include, for example,
the importance of recognizing the inherent limitations of planning and setting
our planning horizons accordingly; 3 of recognizing the various component
parts of the planning task and designing decision-making mechanisms with
this in mind; 4 of rejecting the concept of an objectively "good" or "right"
plan; accepting that plans are only as good as the process that develops
and implements them, and the process, in turn, is only effective if it offers
society as a whole, with a little help from the planners, a mechanism for fairly
setting priorities and defining a "desired future".
As these themes are developed throughout the book, a number of important points become apparent. First, planners do not necessarily know
what is best for society. They do, of course, know what is best for them.
Thus, their "findings" about what is best are usually nothing more or less
than a statement of their own particular values. To use Professor Roberts'
phraseology, the technical jargon and the "facts" which "seem to lead so
determinably to the planners' decisions [are] actually based on their view of
the end product." 5 Secondly, reformers' preoccupation with efficiency is not
necessarily misplaced because the cost to society of delayed approvals is
considerable. Most efficiency measures, however, are counter-productive and
almost all are done at the expense of another equally laudable goal, public
'While the book clearly recognizes the all-encompassing nature of planning, it
on land use planning.
focusses
2
N. Roberts, The Reform of Planning Law (London: The MacMillan Co. Ltd.,
1976) 10.
s3Like A. Toffler in Future Shock, Roberts notes the futility of trying to produce
plans in a rapidly changing society. The problem is not new. Roberts uses a delightful
quote from Tolstoy's description of Napoleon at the Battle of Borodino in War and Peace
to show that the information on which we make decisions is usually outdated and irrelevant as soon as we get it: id. at 231.
4 To the extent that Roberts emphasizes the importance of the process and its
relationship to the task at hand, he seems to be applying, very successfully, a FullerWeiler jurisprudential analysis to English planning law. The jurisprudential basis for
such a comment may be found in L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (2nd ed., New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1969) and P. Weiler, Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making
(1968), 46 Can. B. Rev. 406.
5 Supra, note 2 at 79.
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participation. Finally, given the complex, multifaceted nature of planning, no
one process will necessarily produce the best results. Adjudication, especially
as it has developed in the context of the public inquiry, may be an excellent
way to air both viewpoints when dealing with planning permission; it clearly
is not the best way to formulate general plans. What may be needed is
a process, like the newly developed public examination, that digs out all (or
as many as possible) points of view and then facilitates compromise among
the participants. In any event, to be effective, the process must be tailored
to the task at hand."
Planning is clearly an elusive art. Most, including Professor Roberts,
agree that society should engage in it, but few are particularly happy with the
result it is producing. Since 1947,J the United Kingdom has experimented
with a variety of planning "concepts" ranging from public inquiries to public
examinations, from survey plans to structure plans, and from case-by-case
approvals to some automatic approvals. None has proven particularly effective. While the rationale for planning may lie in the socially unacceptable
uses that were prohibited by the process, there is little doubt that chronic
housing shortages, unemployed construction workers, astronomical land
prices, and a general lack of co-ordinated decision-making attest to the overall
failure of planning.
Most attempts to reform land use planning have been directed at expediting the approval or disapproval process and making it more efficient.
But according to Professor Roberts, the "reformed" system is neither efficient
nor is it particularly fair to those who are directly or indirectly affected by
the output of the system.
Professor Roberts uses his rather considerable understanding of political,
administrative and legal processes not only to mount an effective attack on
planning as it is presently practised in the United Kingdom, but also to suggest
the parameters of a reformed planning process and more effective planning
law. He divides the book into three parts. The first comprises two chapters,
one describing government reorganization and the second providing a brief
introduction into the relationship between government finance, particularly
the property tax, and land use planning. Both provide useful background
material to the more important Part Two; however, neither really alerts the
reader to the excellent analysis of land use planning that follows. In fact, the
author suggests that those already acquainted with the literature in these two
areas should proceed directly to Part Two, and this is good advice. Part Three
provides both an excellent conclusion to the second part, and offers some
thoughts on fundamental ways of reforming land use planning.
Before discussing Part Two, one point must be emphasized because it is
too often overlooked by students of land use planning. Chapter Three, which
deals with financial reform, alludes briefly, perhaps too briefly, to the role of
the rating system or property tax in local land use planning. As Roberts points
out: it is a system that imposes no tax burden on under-utilized property, pro6

7

Again, see, Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra, note 4.
Town & Country PlanningAct, 1947 (10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51).
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vides no incentive for the owner to use the land more productively, and provides no likelihood of the planning authority predicting when this land will come
into more productive use. Thus, by not integrating property taxes and planning
goals, the two may work at cross purposes or at least not compliment one
another.8 Recent reforms, according to Roberts, enacted under the Local
Government Acts0 provide taxing flexibility to overcome these problems, but
the author provides little information as to whether rating policies have
changed substantially and if so, whether this has enhanced the land use
planning process. Nevertheless, the reader is introduced at the outset to the
important relationship between governmental organization, local government
finance and land use planning.
Part One is primarily descriptive; those looking for a probing, thoughtful
analysis of the planning process must wait until Part Two.
As Professor Roberts points out in the preface, he is as much a political
scientist and administrative theorist as he is a lawyer,' 0 and this is certainly
reflected in Part Two. Hardly a paragraph goes by without the reader gleaning
some insight into why land use planning does not work very well in England
and Wales and, for that matter, North America. His analysis suggests many
defects in our planning systems as well.
Taking a page from the administrative theorists, Professor Roberts begins
by identifying the goals of the planning exercise." They are not, he suggests,
to produce plans for their own sake, but rather to generate a process that best
reflects society's conception today of its best interests tomorrow. The task,
of course, is too complex for any single, rational administrative system. 12 All
we can do in the circumstances is design a process that ensures that this
"desired future" reflects as many interests as possible without being so
cumbersome as to make change impossible. But if this is the goal, how is it
best accomplished?
Throughout the past twenty-five years, planning in England and Wales
has undergone a number of important changes, all of which are described and
analyzed by Professor Roberts.
"Unreformed" planning in England, that is planning based primarily on
the 1947 legislation, was plagued with a number of serious problems. By and
8 Undertaxing vacant land and taxing building improvements may also lead to
"leapfrog" development and the demolition of historical buildings, both often contrary
to the land use plans of the jurisdiction.
9 Local Government Act, 1972 (1972, c. 70); Local Government Act, 1974 (1974,

c. 7).
10 Supra, note 2 at Ad.
11 Or, to use the terminology of the administrative organizational theorists, "goal
identification". See, for example, James March & Herbert Simon, Organizations (New
York: Wiley, 1958).
12 The book's emphasis on the futility of prescribing the impossible reminds the
reviewer of the Nova Scotia Planning experience. Under The Planning Act, S.N.S. 1969,
c. 16, municipalities were required to make "development plans" within two years. Since
then the deadline for such plans has been extended every two years. In the spring of
1976, only a handful of municipalities had complied with the original statutory directive.
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large, they are all an inherent feature of the basic premise of the English land
use planning system, namely, that development is best regulated by case-bycase permission (or lack of permission) that is only vaguely related to local
"development plans". In retrospect, the problems seem obvious. By leaving
planning to the local units, there is no real co-ordination among units, and no
co-ordination between local, regional and national planning authorities.
Furthermore, by divorcing plan-making from plan-applying (regulation), the
regulators or caseworkers are given wide discretion to determine who will
be regulated and on what bases. When one adds to this a lack of qualified
personnel and the absence of a mechanism to ensure that all affected parties
are given a voice in the planning and approval process,'3 the plan-making
function becomes largely superfluous and the plan-approving function becomes
open to serious abuse. Frustration and alienation, not good plans, become
the most important output of the planning process. To use Professor Roberts'
words, "It somehow lacked legitimacy."' 4 Planning lacked legitimacy because
it did not meet any of the expectations of society.
Reforms instituted in 1968 and 197315 have not really alleviated the
earlier planning problems. One of the most important features of the changes
is the move away from survey and development plans toward structure plans.
The structure plan was designed to provide more direction for the caseworkers
who deal with planning problems on a case-by-case basis and thus ensure a
proper link between plan-making and plan-applying. Roberts' review of the
planning experiences in both Greater London and the Midlands' 6 leads him
to conclude that few plans (new or old) contain the specificity needed to be
anything more than empty platitudes, and fewer still really represent the
aspirations of the community for which they were designed. In light of these
conclusions, the better approach is to limit plan-making to a fact-finding,
fact-evaluating, general policy-making exercise, and to stop trying to produce
a single document that is supposed to be all things for all people.
Another equally important "reform" is the move away from the public
inquiry toward the public examination of plans and major approvals. The
public inquiry was envisaged originally as a procedure for investigating certain
facets of the approval process as well as the making of development plans.
From this inauspicious beginning, it evolved, with the assistance of the Franks
Committee recommendations, into a "major adjudicatory mechanism" and a
"forum for decision-making in its own right.' 7 For some issues, such as
reviewing the Greater London District Plan, the public inquiry clearly provided a useful, although time-consuming, mechanism for testing the factual
validity of information and re-evaluating the basic premises upon which the
3

1 In this regard the courts seriously curtailed the rights of many "affected parties"
to participate in the planning process. See, for example, Buxton v. Minister of Housing
and Local Government, [1960] 3 All E.R. 408.
14 Supra, note 2 at 78.
15 Town & Country Planning Act, 1968 (1968, c. 72); Town & Country Planning
Act, 1972 (1972, c. 42).

16Supra, note 2 at 119 ff. & 130 ff.
17 Id. at 74.
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recommendations contained within the plan were made. For most, the inquiry
offered unhappy developers an even more useful device for bogging down the
refusal process. Perhaps characteristically, the lawyers who were so adept at
representing their property clients before inquiries, "did not seem... particularly inventive in applying those procedures to the benefit of other affected
members of the community ....18 The delays and the combatant features of
the public inquiry led reformers to experiment with something called a public
examination. Because of the public examinations' more open-ended, flexible
approach to evaluating plans, it has proven to be a marked improvement over
the public inquiry with two important exceptions: unlike the public inquiry,
the public examination has no built-in device that will probe and test the
validity of facts and recommendations, and, again, unlike the inquiry, there
is virtually no room for one 'little man' to have much impact through such an
open ended, wide ranging debate. These tasks may be performed by the chairman, providing he is an experienced prober; however, the general experience
is that very little probing is done by anyone. On the basis of these conclusions,
Roberts argues that the inquiry may serve a very useful function in resolving
rather narrow, two-party disputes, provided all .relevant persons are parties
to the inquiry; while the examination may be the most useful way of focussing
on the more general concerns of society and, in particular, how those concerns
might best be expressed in a plan. In both cases, it is important to recognize
that certain procedures can best deal with certain kinds of tasks, and that,
regardless of the procedure, it is crucial that affected persons have equal rights
to participate in the plan-making and plan-approving processes.
Almost all attempts to reform the process have focussed on making it
more efficient, but these, according to Professor Roberts, often increase the
problems rather than minimize them. To speed up approvals, caseworkers
were given more discretion on how they disposed of the case, and, more
recently, the power to categorize applications as either substantial or insubstantial, with only the former normally requiring detailed approval. More
discretion, however, merely makes the approval process more uncertain and
hence more difficult for caseworkers. Categorization may make sense, but
only if there is some fair and rational way to categorize applications. To leave
this function to the caseworkers' unfettered discretion, merely accentuates
the problems associated with heaping more discretion on decision-makers
without imposing appropriate checks and controls. The "efficiency problem"
may be alleviated somewhat, according to Professor Roberts, by looking to
the American general rule-making experience. Rather than a continuing commitment to case-by-case approvals with enormous discretionary powers vested
in a case worker, the English may be better advised to look to some combination of zoning powers and specific site approvals.
The final part of the book provides both a detailed conclusion to Part
Two and some useful comparative material from Sweden about how legislators
might fundamentally reform land use planning, rather than merely tampering
with the existing system.1 9 Thus, Part Three provides, in a sense, the best of
18 d.at 75.
19
The discussion is put in the context of a recent Labour Government White Paper
entitled Land White Paper, Land, comnd. 5730 (H.M.S.O., 1974).
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both worlds. First, by way of concluding Part Two, it suggests a number of
innovations that might truly "reform" the process and then, by way of speculating about a more enlightened government and a more liberal political
philosophy, it suggests a new basis for dealing with land use problems, namely,
limited public ownership and development. For some North American readers,
this may be too politically unpalatable for them to digest. Furthermore,
Roberts' earlier suggestion that incremental change in the planning process
may, in the long run, accomplish more than grandiose reform packages would
seem to point to a contradiction. For these reasons, it may detract from both
Parts Two and Three. It should not, however. Suggested fundamental reform
does not lessen the need to make piecemeal improvement in the existing
system. In fact, in the context of this book and its focus on procedure, it may
simply be saying that once we have a proper procedure in place for making
decisions about our desired future, one future that society should consider is
limited public ownership of land for recreational and residential development
purposes.
Before anyone embraces Professor Roberts' idea of increased public
ownership, however limited the proposal may be, the book contains a mostly
unstated caveat. 20 Public ownership may be fine, but the same bureaucracy
that produced so many problems with the existing system will presumably be
called upon to assemble, manage, develop and dispose of this newly acquired
land. Until there is some evidence that the bureaucracy and the decisionmaking process can be reformed, there is no reason to entrust this scheme
to them, whatever the apparent benefits.
By way of concluding, it is interesting to note that after reading the book,
one is left still wondering whether planning is ever anything more than an
exercise in futility. Professor Roberts certainly paints a bleak picture about its
past futility in England. There are enough excellent suggestions in the book,
however, to help ensure that the reform of planning law is not only feasible,
but something we should start doing immediately. The book's focus on process
and its suggestion that planners may function best as brokers, and lawyers
as advocates in a limited number of situations is something that Canadians
should keep in mind before we end up with thirty years of planning mistakes
behind us.
By D. PAUL BMOND*
2

0 While Professor Roberts suggests that this may be a problem, see, supra, note 2

at 10 ff.; he doesn't warn the reader of the dangers of giving an already ineffective

bureaucracy more responsibilities in the land development sphere.
* ©Copyright, 1976, D. Paul Emond. Paul Emond is an Assistant Professor, Faculty
of Law, Dalhousie University.

